



Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
Federal Communications
Commission,
U.S.-, 90 D.A.R. 7383,
No. 89-453 (June 27, 1990).
Supreme Court Narrowly Upholds
FCC Minority Preference Policies
In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld two minority preference
policies established by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC).
First, it is the FCC's policy to award an
enhancement for minority ownership
and participation in management, which
is weighed together with all other rele-
vant factors in comparing mutually
exclusive applications for license for
new radio or television broadcast sta-
tions. Second, the FCC's so-called "dis-
tress sale" policy allows a radio or tele-
vision broadcaster whose qualifications
to hold a license have come into ques-
tion to transfer that license before the
FCC resolves the matter in a noncom-
parative hearing, but only if the transfer-
ee is a minority enterprise which meets
certain requirements. Metro Broadcast-
ing sought review of an FCC order
awarding a new television license to
Rainbow Broadcasting in a comparative
proceeding, based on the ruling that the
substantial enhancement granted
Rainbow because of its minority owner-
ship outweighed factors favoring Metro.
The FCC adopted these policies in an
attempt to satisfy its obligation under the
Communications Act of 1934 to pro-
mote diversification of programming,
taking the position that its past efforts to
encourage minority participation in the
broadcast industry had not resulted in
sufficient broadcast diversity, and that
this situation was detrimental not only to
the minority audience but to all of the
viewing and listening public.
The Court held that these policies do
not violate equal protection principles,
since they bear the imprimatur of long-
standing congressional support and
direction and are substantially related to
the achievement of the important gov-
ernmental objective of broadcast diversi-
ty. Writing for the five-member majority,
Justice Brennan stated that the strict
scrutiny test does not apply, because the
FCC's minority ownership programs
"have been specifically approved-
indeed, mandated-by Congress," and
the benign race-conscious measures are
constitutionally permissible to the extent
that they serve important governmental
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objectives within the power of Congress
and are substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy, dissent-
ed on grounds that (1) the Constitution
requires that he standard of strict scruti-
ny be applied to evaluate such racial
classifications; and (2) the minority pref-
erence policies were not narrowly tai-




Geary, et al. v. Renne, et al.,
911 F.2d 280, 90 D.A.R. 9032,
No. 88-2875 (August 14, 1990).
Ninth Circuit Strikes Down California's
Ban on Party Endorsements for
Nonpartisan Offices
In this proceeding, plaintiffs were ten
registered voters of the City and County
of San Francisco, an organization of reg-
istered voters, and one of that organiza-
tion's officers. The basis of their com-
plaint was the refusal of the City and
County of San Francisco and the San
Francisco Registrar of Voters to permit
official party and party central commit-
tee endorsements to be printed in the
San Francisco Voter Pamphlet prepared
for elections scheduled for June 2 and
November 3, 1987. Defendants based
their refusal to print such endorsements
on the language of Article II, section
6(b) of the California Constitution,
which provides that no political party or
party central committee may endorse,
support or oppose a candidate for non-
partisan office.
In reversing an earlier decision by a
panel of the Ninth Circuit (see CRLR
Vol. 9, No. 4 (Fall 1989) p. 139 for
background information) and affirming
the district court, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, en banc, held that Article II,
section 6(b) violates the first and four-
teenth amendments of the federal
Constitution. Writing for the majority,
Chief Judge Goodwin concluded that (1)
the state's interest in preserving the non-
partisan nature of California's system of
electing local and judicial officials is not
a compelling state interest; and (2) the
ban on party endorsements is not nar-
rowly tailored to achieve these purposes.
Distinguishing Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce ___U.S._,
110 S.Ct. 1391 (1990), which upheld
restrictions on independent expenditures
by corporations in state candidate elec-
tions, the majority stated that those
restrictions were aimed at preventing
financial fraud and corruption, whereas
the ban on party endorsements was
directed toward restricting the flow of
political information. Relying on its
prior decision in Eu v. San Francisco
Democratic Cent. Comm., 826 F.2d 814
(9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 489 U.S. 214
(1989), invalidating a similar ban on
party endorsements in partisan pri-
maries, the court ascribed no signifi-
cance to the fact that the offices at issue
in Geary were nonpartisan. "The con-
cern in fEu] was with the State's abridg-
ment of the rights of political parties and
their members to exchange ideas and
information, not with the nature of the
elections at issue." The majority also
noted that there are less drastic means
for safeguarding the nonpartisan nature
of local and judicial elections, including
provisions for nonpartisan methods of
nominating candidates for office and
controls on partisan activities of candi-
dates.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Rymer,
joined by Judges Alarcon and
Fernandez, found that the state has a
compelling interest in the structure of its
nonpartisan government and that Article
II, section 6(b) is essential to preserving
that structure. In a separate dissent,
Judge Alarcon criticized the majority for
failing to consider the evidence in the
record and in California history concern-
ing "the devastating impact party
endorsements can have on the integrity
of local office holders and the indepen-
dence of the judiciary."
UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS
Service Employees Int'l Union v.
Fair Political Practices Commission,
F.Supp.-, 90 D.A.R. 11170,





Just six weeks before election day,
U.S. District Court Judge Lawrence K.
Karlton of the Eastern District of
California struck down the contribution
limits applicable to all campaigns for
election to state and local office estab-
lished in Proposition 73, passed by the
voters in June 1988. (See CRLR Vol. 9,
No. 4 (Fall 1989) pp. 140-41 and Vol. 8,
No. 2 (Spring 1988) p. 1 for extensive
background information on Propositions
68 and 73, two campaign reform initia-
tives approved by the electorate in June
No. 4 (Fall 1990)
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1988.)
Proposition 73 established limitations
on campaign contributions that may be
made or accepted during any fiscal year,
defined as the period between July I and
June 30. It also limited candidates to
raising funds for a particular office, and
set forth procedural requirements
regarding establishment of a campaign
bank account and reporting to the FPPC.
Finally, it prohibited the transfer of
funds between candidates and controlled
committees of a single candidate.
Three incumbent legislators spon-
sored Proposition 73. In this action (one
of numerous lawsuits seeking to invali-
date all or parts of both Propositions 68
and 73), the original plaintiffs-chal-
lenging the contribution limits as viola-
tive of their first amendment rights of
speech and association-were a number
of incumbent legislators, various cam-
paign committees, labor organizations,
and a contributor to political campaigns.
The Democratic Party also intervened as
a plaintiff, arguing that the provisions of
Proposition 73 which prohibited it from
contributing more than $5,000 to any
candidate in any fiscal year, or from
accepting contributions of more than
$2,500 from any one person in any fis-
cal year for the purpose of making con-
tributions to a particular candidate, hin-
dered it from engaging in voter registra-
tion and membership communication
activities regarding its endorsement of
candidates.
The court engaged in a sequential
analysis: it first examined whether the
challenged provisions of Proposition 73
impinge upon rights protected by the
first amendment; then, it examined
whether there is a sufficiently strong
governmental interest served by the
statute's restriction on those rights;
finally, it determined whether the provi-
sions are "narrowly tailored to the evil
which may be legitimately regulated."
The court first found that Proposition
73's fiscal year contribution limitations
"in and of themselves constitute a bur-
den upon First Amendment activity."
The court noted that the only govern-
mental interests deemed important
enough to outweigh a first amendment
restriction were (1) limiting the actuality
or appearance of corruption in elections;
and (2) limiting the "corrosive and dis-
torting effects of immense aggregations
of wealth that are accumulated with the
help of the corporate form and that have
little or no correlation to the public's
support for the corporation's political
ideas," from the recently decided Austin
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,
U.S._ , 110 S.Ct. 1391 (1990).
Thus, plaintiffs contended that the
limitations on contributions measured
by fiscal year, rather than by election,
worked an unconstitutional preference
for incumbents and against challengers.
The justification for the fiscal year
structure put forth by defendants was
that it allows any candidate who is suc-
cessful in the June primary to receive
more contributions in the November
general election from persons who gave
the maximum allowable contributions
for the primary election. In both its 208
findings of fact and its conclusions of
law, the court found that this arrange-
ment provides a major benefit to incum-
bents-the very evil Proposition 73 pur-
ports to ameliorate. Thus, it "clearly
fails the legitimate governmental inter-
est and narrow tailoring test...." The
court then found the fiscal year contri-
bution limitations inseverable from the
contribution limit provisions in general,
and thus struck down all provisions of
Proposition 73 relating to limitations on
campaign contributions.
The court's basic holding is based on
the fact that incumbents are in a position
to solicit and receive $1,000 each fiscal
year from their supporters as they hold
office-building up an intimidating fund
to deter challenge. For a state senator,
this continuous gathering of funds
allows $5,000 from each individual con-
tributor in any given term of office,
since there are five fiscal years within
the four-calendar-year term of a senator.
In contrast, when a challenger appears
during an election year to challenge
such an incumbent, he/she is effectively
subject to a $1,000 limit per individual
contributor. The court found that this
system, in fact, operated to deprive chal-
lengers of meaningful opportunity to
compete. The court implied that the lim-
its of Proposition 68, which are based
not on fiscal years but on primary and
general elections, respectively, would
not create the same constitutional prob-
lem, since the limits are applied to both
on a more equal practical basis.
The court also invalidated the initia-
tive's ban on transfers of funds between
candidates and controlled committees of
a single candidate. "It is clear that the
ban acts as an expenditure limitation;
such limitations have never been upheld,
save in connection with the expenditures
of corporations."
In the chaos that followed Judge
Karlton's September 25 ruling, the
FPPC announced that it would immedi-
ately begin enforcing the similar cam-
paign contribution limits in Proposition
68 as to legislative races. However,
three days after his original ruling,
Judge Karlton stayed it as to legislative
races, thus reimposing Proposition 73's
contribution limits. The original order
striking the limits remained effective as
to statewide races, thus unleashing a
frenzy of fundraising activity and a tor-
rent of campaign contributions to candi-
dates for statewide offices, particularly
the hotly-contested gubernatorial race.
Chemical Specialties Manufacturers
Association, Inc. v. Allenby,
744 F.Supp. 934, 90 D.A.R. 10903,
No. C90-021 I-FMS (September 13,
1990).
Proposition 65 Not Preempted by
Federal Statutes
Plaintiff, a trade association whose
members manufacture a variety of
chemical specialty products, filed an
action for declaratory judgment, seeking
a ruling that the warning requirements
of Proposition 65, the Safe Drinking
Water and Toxics Enforcement Act of
1986, are preempted by two federal
statutes-the Federal Fungicide,
Insecticide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA), and the Federal Hazardous
Substances Act (FHSA). The U.S.
District Court for the Northern District
of California found that the issue of
FIFRA preemption was previously
decided in D-Con v. Allenby, 728
F.Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1989); in that
case, the court found that FIFRA
expressly permits state regulation of
pesticide sale and use.
With regard to FHSA, the court con-
cluded that "Congress clearly did not
intend to occupy this entire area of regu-
lation, as evidenced by the fact that
states are expressly allowed certain
functions under both FIFRA and
FHSA." The court also stated that "[n]o
evidence shows the impossibility of




Californians for Native Salmon &
Steelhead Ass'n v. California
Dep't of Forestry, et al.,
221 Cal. App. 3d 1419, 90 D.A.R. 7673,
No. A046232 (July 6, 1990).
Action for Declaratory Relief
Appropriate in Challenging
Alleged "Pattern and Practice"
of Unlawful Conduct by Forestry
Department
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The First District Court of Appeal
recently reversed the trial court's dis-
missal and reinstated an action for
declaratory relief challenging the
California Department of Forestry's
(CDF) alleged policies regarding two
issues: (1) the time of filing of CDF's
responses to public comments on a tim-
ber harvesting plan (THP); and (2) the
evaluation and mitigation in each THP
of the cumulative impact of logging
activities.
In its original complaint, plaintiffs
challenged CDF's approval of a specific
THP in a combined petition for writ of
mandate/complaint for injunctive and
declaratory relief. They sought not only
to vacate the THP approval, but declara-
tory relief outside the THP at issue con-
cerning a "pattern and practice" of agen-
cy conduct allegedly in violation of the
California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA). During the judicial proceed-
ing, the THP grantee withdrew the THP
and moved for an order dismissing it as
a party. Co-respondents CDF and Board
of Forestry demurred to the complaint,
arguing that the challenges to the THP
were moot and that there was no longer
a justiciable controversy "in that the
pleading refers to unspecified timber
harvest plans and to an unidentified con-
tention or policy of Respondents." The
trial court dismissed the THP grantee
and sustained the demurrer with leave to
amend to make more specific allega-
tions regarding CDF's policies.
Plaintiffs' first amended pleading
was a straight complaint for declaratory
and injunctive relief, alleging and chal-
lenging "the pattern and practice of the
California Department of Forestry in
their [sic] approval of timber harvest
plans, both in their failure to evaluate
and respond to comments, and to assess
cumulative impacts as mandated by the
California courts." Specifically, plain-
tiffs allege that CDF regularly approves
THPs and allows timber operations to
commence without issuing written
responses to significant environmental
objection by the public no more than ten
days from the date the plan is approved,
contrary to the requirements in sections
1037.7 and 1037.8 of the Forest Practice
Rules and CEQA, as interpreted in
EPIC v. Johnson, 170 Cal. App. 3d 604
(1985), and other cases. Further, plain-
tiffs allege that, in numerous instances,
CDF has failed to address the cumula-
tive impacts of the proposed harvest
along with other past, present and pro-
posed harvests, pursuant to CEQA and
EPIC v. Johnson. Plaintiffs allege a list
of 65 approved THPs as illustrative of
respondents' "procedure" to issue
responses to public comments tardily or
not at all, and of respondents' having
"consistently ignored" their duty to
assess cumulative impacts. Respondents
demurred to the amended complaint.
The trial court sustained the demurrer,
and plaintiffs appealed.
In reversing and remanding for trial,
the appellate court held that an action
for declaratory relief is a proper vehicle,
noting that the material factual allega-
tions of plaintiffs' complaint have been
admitted by respondents' demurrer.
"Appellants allege and respondents dis-
pute whether CDF is engaged in conduct
or has established policies in violation
of applicable statutes, regulations, and
judicial decisions. Clearly the allega-
tions of appellants' complaint sufficient-
ly set forth an actual controversy over
significant aspects of respondents' legal-
ly-mandated duties."
In response to CDF's argument that
plaintiffs are merely expressing dissatis-
faction with a series of 65 THP
approvals, the court again noted that
plaintiffs allege a "pattern and practice"
of conduct violative of the law, which
has been admitted by means of respon-
dents' demurrer. The court also rejected
respondents' argument that plaintiffs'
challenge should be by way of a petition
for administrative mandamus; "[a]ppel-
lants...challenge not a specific order or
decision, or even a series thereof, but an
overarching, quasi-legislative policy set
by an administrative agency. Such a pol-
icy is subject to review in an action for
declaratory relief."
On September 19, the California
Supreme Court denied respondents'
petition for review. At this writing, this
action is proceeding to trial.
Midpeninsula Citizens for Fair
Housing v. Westwood Investors, et al.,
221 Cal. App. 3d 1377, 90 D.A.R. 7614,
No. H005191 (July 2, 1990).
Sixth Appellate District Upholds Broad
Standing to Halt Unlawful Business
Practice
Following the lead of the First
District Court of Appeal, the Sixth
District Court of Appeal held that non-
aggrieved persons may sue for injunc-
tive relief under California's unfair com-
petition statute, Business and
Professions Code section 17204. In
Midpeninsula, a nonprofit organization
sued under the Unruh Civil Rights Act,
Civil Code section 51 et seq., and the
unfair competition laws to enjoin an
apartment complex rental policy which
limited occupancy to one person per
bedroom. The court found that
Midpeninsula is not a "person ag-
grieved" within the meaning of the
Unruh Act, nor does Midpeninsula have
the representative standing to sue under
that Act. Citing extensively to
Consumers Union of United States, Inc.
v. Fisher Development, Inc., 208 Cal.
App. 3d 1433 (1989), the court held
that-even though the organization
lacked standing under the Unruh Act-it
could still obtain injunctive relief under
the state's unfair competition laws,
which provide that "any person acting
for the interests of itself, its members or
the general public" is entitled to bring
an action for injunctive relief from any
"unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business
practice."
As in the Consumers Union case, the
court noted that courts have consistently
given a broad interpretation to the stand-
ing provisions of the unfair competition
laws, finding that the narrower standing
requirements of the Unruh Act coincide
with the treble damages and attorneys'
fees available under that Act, while only
injunctive relief is available under the
broader Business and Professions Code
section 17204.
Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.,
222 Cal. App. 3d 289, 90 D.A.R. 8307,
No. H003695 (July 20, 1990).
Independent Auditors Liable to Third
Party Investors for Professional
Negligence
In a case arising from the collapse of
the Osborne Computer Corporation, the
Sixth District Court of Appeal upheld
damages awarded against Arthur Young
& Company for its failure to exercise
reasonable care as an independent audi-
tor.
In 1981, Osborne engaged Arthur
Young & Company to audit its financial
statements; plaintiffs ubsequently relied
on the unqualified audit opinion issued
by Arthur Young in January 1983 in
making substantial purchases of
Osborne stock. Because of significant
weaknesses in Osborne's internal
accounting procedures, the financial
statements were overly optimistic; in
1983, Osborne went into bankruptcy,
resulting in substantial losses for the
investors. The investors sued Arthur
Young for professional negligence.
In upholding the damages awarded to
most of the investors, the court rejected
Arthur Young's argument that the duty
of care owed by independent auditors
should be defined solely by generally
accepted auditing standards (GAAS)
and generally accepted accounting pro-
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cedures (GAAP). Instead, the court held
that GAAS and GAAP served only as
"some evidence" of the proper standard
of care, and that "it is the general rule
that adherence to a relevant custom or
practice does not necessarily establish
the actor has met the standard of care."
The court explained that restricting an
auditor's duty strictly to GAAS and
GAAP "would inappropriately entrust to
the accountancy profession itself the
balancing of interests implicit in any
determination of duty and breach."
The court also rejected Arthur
Young's request to severely narrow the
scope of persons to whom auditors owe
a duty of care. Citing International
Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler
Accountancy Corporation, 177 Cal.
App. 3d 806 (1986), the court held that
independent auditors are liable to "those
third parties who reasonably and fore-
seeably rely on negligently prepared and
issued unqualified audited financial
statements, regardless of whether the
third parties were in contractual privity
with, or their reliance was actually fore-
seen by, the auditor."
The court also held that the trial court
correctly denied Arthur Young's motion
to exclude all evidence concerning its
failure to disclose material weaknesses
in Osborne's internal accounting con-
trols, finding that independent auditors
are required to assess the sufficiency of
an audit client's internal accounting con-
trols and, where material weaknesses
exist, to test the accuracy of information
provided by the client and inform the
senior management, board of directors,
and the board's audit committee of the
material weaknesses. The court held that
evidence of Arthur Young's nondisclo-
sure was relevant to whether the auditor
"failed to exercise professional skill suf-
ficient to discover, or had discovered but
for whatever reason had mischaracter-
ized or disregarded, the fact that
Osborne Computer Corporation lacked
adequate internal accounting controls,
and in any event had failed to apply
auditing tests and procedures sufficient
to compensate for the lack of internal
controls...."
The International Mortgage and Bily
cases are likely to be important prece-
dents in litigation arising from the col-
lapse of California savings and loans.
One important aspect of many insolvent
S&Ls is the failure of independent audi-
tors to either detect or take appropriate
actions to correct weak internal account-
ing controls by corrupt or poorly man-
aged thrifts.
Bjornestad v. Hulse, et al.,
223 Cal. App. 3d 507, 90 D.A.R. 10895,
No. C007526 (September 5, 1990).
Water District's One-Parcel, One-Vote
Election Scheme Violates Equal
Protection
In this proceeding, the Sixth District
Court of Appeal held Water Code sec-
tion 30700.6 to be unconstitutional
under the equal protection clauses of the
California and federal constitutions.
Section 30700.6 provides that only one
designated landowner per parcel in the
Sierra Lakes County Water District
-regardless of his/her residency-may
vote in a district election or be a mem-
ber of the district's governing board of
directors.
The court found that the county
water district had broad public function
and governmental powers which distin-
guished it from the districts in caselaw
where property-based restrictions have
been upheld, and concluded that he
interests of nonlandowning residents
were such that they could not be
deprived of their right to vote.
County of Sacramento, et al. v. Fair
Political Practices Commission,
222 Cal. App. 3d 687, 90 D.A.R. 8525,
No. C005845 (July 27, 1990).
Local Campaign Financing Ordinance
Preempted by Proposition 73
In this proceeding, the Third District
Court of Appeal held that Proposition
73's ban on the use of public funds for
political campaigns (codified in
Government Code section 85300) pre-
vails over a Sacramento County ordi-
nance providing for limited public
financing of supervisorial campaigns.
Proposition 73, enacted by the state
electorate at the June 1988 general elec-
tion, amended the Political Reform Act
of 1974, and provides in part that no
public officer shall expend and no can-
didate shall accept any public moneys
for the purpose of seeking elective
office. Section 15-B of the Sacramento
Charter provides for partial public
financing of contests for county elective
offices for those candidates who agree
to certain limits on campaign expendi-
tures.
Writing for a unanimous court,
Justice Puglia found that (1) "the
integrity of election contests is a long-
standing matter of statewide interest;"
(2) "[bly its terms Proposition 73
applies to local and statewide elections
alike" and was "intended to establish a
single statewide body of law pertaining
to the financing of election campaigns;"
and (3) the ballot materials accompany-
ing Proposition 73 specifically discuss
the issue of public campaign financing
by local governments. On this basis, the
court concluded that "the express lan-
guage of section 85300 as well as its
legislative history manifest a statewide
concern with campaign financing which
perforce prevails over conflicting local
provisions."
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